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RICHARD BUSBOOM, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN DIEGO COUNTY, Respondent; THOMAS E. KELLER, Real Party in Interest
Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division One
December 18, 1980
The Petitioner Richard Busboom and his brother Dean were riding motorcycles when Dean was run down by Keller, driving a car in the wrong lane while drunk. The petitioner was seriously injured. He brought this lawsuit along with the parents of both boys, who however have since settled. Although the original complaint, filed October 24, 1978 alleged in general terms Keller’s willful, reckless and wanton misconduct, those allegations were not sufficient to recover punitive damages. However, after Taylor came down in August 1979, Richard sought leave to amend his complaint with appropriate allegations, and the superior court granted such leave on March 6, 1980, soon after Mau, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d 875, was decided. Petitioner brought an action against real party, which sought punitive damages. The trial court granted partial summary judgment for driver, and stuck the punitive damage claim. Petitioner injured person sought a writ of mandate ordering respondent Superior Court of San Diego County to vacate its grant of partial summary judgment striking petitioner’s claim for punitive damages in petitioner’s suit against real party in interest drunk driver.
Issues:
Whether Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890 [157 Cal.Rptr. 693, 598 P.2d 854], permitting recovery of punitive damages in an appropriate drunk driving case, shall apply retroactively to accidents occurring before August 1979?
Whether the victim’s amended complaint was sufficient to claim punitive damages?
Discussion:
This court held that overruling decisions, especially in the tort field, are normally applied retroactively unless there has been great public reliance on the earlier rule, the new rule was nowhere foreshadowed, and it would be unfair to apply the rule retrospectively. Retrospective application in cases like these is not an enormous burden. It affects only cases pending, or still within the statute of limitations for such claims, when Taylor was decided. That number is not large, since the short tort statute of limitations will limit the retrospective effect to accidents occurring after August 1978, as well as all cases already filed and pending when Taylor came down. This limited effect is not an unconscionable burden on insurance companies.
This court also held the victim’s complaint, as amended, was sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages, since it specifically alleged a deliberate disregard for the safety and interest of others such as to constitute malice. The original complaint stated Keller was intoxicated as the result of his “willful acts”; he drove his pickup truck southbound in the northbound lane of the highway in reckless disregard for the safety of northbound traffic, injuring plaintiffs. The later amendment further pleaded Keller drove when intoxicated with knowledge of the safety hazard he created and was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, which he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid. It further states Keller’s conduct shows he acted with a conscious and deliberate disregard for the safety and interest of others such as to constitute malice. It is not clear this pleading would have sufficed under the approach taken in Gombos v. Ashe, supra, 158 Cal.App.2d 517, but it is certainly sufficient under G. D. Searle & Co., supra, 49 Cal.App.3d 22, read in conjunction with Taylor. Although such a pleading might have been deemed insufficient before Taylor, we find it neither unfair nor unreasonable to permit it now, particularly because, as pointed out in Dawes, it is not clear Taylor has really changed the law as it applies to this pleading.
Conclusion:
This court hence granted the writ of mandate and ordered respondent trial court to vacate its order of summary judgment and to issue a new order denying summary judgment because punitive damages were appropriate where there was conscious disregard for safety. This court found that the actions of real party in interest drunk driver indicated a conscious disregard.
Disclaimer:
These summaries are provided by the SRIS Law Group. They represent the firm’s unofficial views of the Justices’ opinions. The original opinions should be consulted for their authoritative content
Originally published here.
Atchuthan Sriskandarajah